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Jihadist and Far-Right Extremism: Subjectivity, Embodiment
and Imaginaries of Violence
Kevin McDonald
Radicalisation: A Contested Concept
Over the past 15 years a new kind of violence has emerged in the demo-
cratic societies of Europe, North America and the Pacific, from attacks on
the transport systems in London and Madrid in 2005, to other forms of ex-
treme violence including the killing of over 180 people by a jihadist com-
mando group in Paris in November 2015. During the period 2011 to 2017
some 5,000 Europeans travelled to Syria to join jihadist groups. While trav-
el to Syria to join jihadist groups experienced a dramatic reduction follow-
ing the military defeats experienced by the Islamic State and the loss of its
capital, Raqqa, in October 2017, radicalised violence has nonetheless con-
tinued in Europe. In the final three months of 2019 four police officers
were murdered by a colleague at Police Headquarters in Paris (Vincent and
Cahpuis 2019); two passers-by were murdered during an attempted mas-
sacre at a Synagogue in Halle in Germany (Koehler 2019); and two partici-
pants were killed while attending a prison education event in London
(Guardian staff, 2019). In Paris and London, the killers were supporters of
jihadist violence, while in Halle the suspected killer live-streamed the at-
tack to an online gaming platform, claiming it as an action in defence of
the white race (Koehler 2019).
It was during the past 15 years that the concept of ‘radicalisation’
emerged in its current form, becoming increasingly widespread following
the publication of Radicalization in the West: the Homegrown Threat by the
New York Police Department in 2007 (Bhatt and Silber 2007). This was an
attempt to understand what was seen to be a break with organised terror-
ism that had been present in Europe and North America during the 1970s
and into the 1980s. The violence that emerged from the mid-2000s was of-
ten improvised, undertaken by friends, by family-based networks, or by in-
dividuals. This was very different from the groups that emerged out of the
collapsing student movement in the 1970s: the Weather Underground in
the United States, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in Ger-
many, and the Japanese Red Army (for an overview of these groups see Mc-
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Donald 2013). These militarised groups that emerged as the radical student
movement collapsed were understood as expressions of ‘clandestine politi-
cal violence’ (Della Porta 2013), the product of a mutation of a social
movement or conflict. A key to the analysis of these groups was a process
of ‘competitive escalation’ (Della Porta 2013), where increasingly violent
demonstrations were met by, or a response to, increasingly violent polic-
ing, with activist groups coming to understand themselves as ‘at war’ with
the state, in particular the police, and modelling themselves as ‘urban guer-
rillas’ inspired by romantic images of Cuban or Palestinian fighters. Al-
most all the members of the groups that emerged in the 1970s were former
student activists, who, frustrated at what they believed to be the impossi-
bility of radical social change, gradually came to embrace clandestinity and
political violence. This was not the case with the jihadist violence that be-
came increasingly evident in Europe from the mid-2000s, where those in-
volved had little or no previous experience of activism.
In its first iteration, ‘radicalisation’ as an explanatory paradigm was an
expression of strain theory, where young second generation immigrants
find themselves caught ‘in between’ the world of their parents that is no
longer intelligible, and a new society they experience as exclusionary or
stigmatising. Not surprisingly, this approach to radicalisation was first for-
mulated in the United States, drawing on North American approaches to
migration, social integration and theories of the rise of gangs. Young peo-
ple according to this approach were in experiences of uncertain transition,
and it was the failure of European society to achieve the integration of sec-
ond-generation migrants that was seen as the ultimate cause of radicalisa-
tion – something that emerged where social identity was in crisis, leading
to an increasingly religious search for self (Bhatt and Silber 2007). It is im-
portant to note that this understanding of generation and integration was
framed by a broader cultural context shaped by theories of ‘clash of civi-
lizations’, particularly influential in the period following the collapse of
the Berlin Wall (Huntington 1996). In its initial formulation, radicalisa-
tion was conceived as a linear process, leading from vulnerability, through
indoctrination, to ‘jihadization’ and then ‘attack’. Thus framed, radicalisa-
tion was understood as a process where failure of social integration exacer-
bated religious identity-seeking to the point where this became violent.
Understood in this way, the term ‘radicalisation’ has been hotly contest-
ed. While it frames major public policy initiatives such as the European
Radicalisation Awareness Network or national programmes such as Pre-
vent in the United Kingdom, its critics argue that this framework has em-
bedded within it an opposition between ‘old terrorism’ intelligible in po-
litical terms and a ‘new terrorism’ with its origins in Islamist theology.
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Critics argue that the use of ‘radicalisation’ as a framework has led to the
creation of ‘suspect communities’ and to a failure to understand the politi-
cal origins of the conflicts and fault lines generating contemporary vio-
lence (Kundnani 2012). From this perspective, radicalisation is understood
as a dimension of what is claimed to be a ‘global rise of religious violence’
(Juergensmeyer 2017). Largely located within disciplines which had previ-
ous engagement with terrorism, in particular International Relations and
Security Studies, this conceptualisation drew on previous models of ‘pro-
paganda’ that had emerged during the Cold War, reframing this within a
paradigm of ‘narrative’ and calling for ‘counter narrative’ as a response.
This appeared to capture the importance of images, videos and digital me-
dia in the jihadist radicalisation of young people that became increasingly
evident with the first departures to Syria in 2011. Just as radicalisation was
seen to be something done to a person, this model of communication was
understood as a one-way transmission of messages, directed in particular to
those vulnerable to recruitment.
There are several problems with this understanding of ‘radicalisation’.
Firstly, it unifies experiences and pathways that are very different, from the
high performing school student to the drug dealer, while separating ‘radi-
calised’ violence from other violence that arguably demonstrates signifi-
cant similarities, such as that of school shooters or its recent development
as incel-violence1. Secondly, while highlighting the importance of digital
communication, early approaches to radicalisation understood such com-
munication as indoctrination or recruitment, drawing on earlier under-
standings of propaganda as a system of one-way communication. While
alert to the importance of communication, there was initially little under-
standing of the ‘social’ and ‘affective’ nature of digital communication
when compared to older models of ‘indoctrination’. Thirdly, while the em-
phasis on vulnerability and strain allowed scope for policies based on pre-
vention and safeguarding, it offered little insight into the forms of agency
involved in radicalisation, and as a result, little insight into the kinds of
agency involved in experiences of disengagement. Within this paradigm,
radicalisation came to be understood as something done to a vulnerable
young person, while equally, deradicalisation is something done to a young
person.
1 ‘Incels’ are men who consider themselves to be rejected by women, and thus ‘in-
voluntary celebates’. The first incel massacre, aimed at female students of the Uni-
versity of California, Santa Barbara, took place in May 2014. For an overview see
Beauchamp 2019.
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This chapter presents research that sets out to understand radicalisation
as agency and experience, and in the process begins to consider what we
can learn from a comparative exploration of radicalisation in Europe and
Asia. The first part of the chapter is based on interviews and focus groups
with 50 members of jihad supporting groups in the United Kingdom to-
gether with an analysis of the social media posts of 30 young people who
travelled to Syria to join jihadist groups between 2013 and 2017 (this is de-
tailed in McDonald 2018). The second part introduces research on experi-
ences of far-right extremism currently emerging in Europe, linking these
to broader networks in particular associated with online digital forums
based in North America. From these cases, several themes are highlighted
in terms of comparison between the European experience and that of Asia.
Jihadist Radicalisation
Recent research has underlined the extent to which radicalisation is a so-
cial process. What sort of social worlds does this take place in, and how
can we approach radicalisation as embodied, imaginary and relational? The
early approaches to radicalisation and violence were largely framed within
a binary of radicalised or not radicalised, violent or not violent. However
my research suggests that we can distinguish between very different kinds
of radicalisation, each framing different imaginaries and practices of vio-
lence. While aspects overlap, we can distinguish three different ‘experi-
ences’ or ‘pathways’ of radicalisation. The first of these centres on ‘us’, and
is constructed around the axes of us/them, inclusion/exclusion, order/disor-
der, or purity/impurity. Across these we encounter affective states organised
around anxiety and the social construction of disgust, as well as the search
for security in a structured and closed community. A second experience of
radicalisation centres on ‘you’, and is built around an affirmation of pow-
er, with significant debt to imaginaries of gaming and to an experiential
structure of the hidden and the revealed, the visible and invisible, winners
and losers. A third focuses on experiences of ‘I’, where we encounter
practices of individuation such as purification of the self, sacrifice of the
self, and experiences of the sublime where a heightened sense of awe and
enormity gives rise to experiences of displacement, in some cases develop-
ing into experiences of the uncanny, danger or dread. This third field is of-
ten experienced by the actors involved in religious terms.
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Us: Communitarian Radicalisation
The first pathway identified is shared across a number of quite different ex-
periences. One expression of communitarian radicalisation possesses the
same building blocks as racism, centred on socially constructed ‘disgust’,
and manifests the experiential structure of racism and hate crime. Here the
imaginary of violence is one of cleansing, one we see starkly evident in the
experience of people such as Aqsa Mahmood, a young woman who left
Glasgow to travel to Syria in 2013. She lived her life on social media, this
was a space both intimate and public, one that she shared with her ‘fam’.
In 2012 she encountered distant suffering, in this case the Israeli incursion
into Gaza, and her social media timeline, once full of interchanges with
her friends, begins to be populated by images of suffering and violence.
Over a period of several months we see a clear transformation occur, evi-
dent in the way she experiences the world: first in terms of good and bad,
then innocent and guilty, then in terms of the pure and the impure. At this
latter point, the ‘other’, in this case Shia Muslims, become experienced as
unclean, grotesque and ultimately a source of contamination. As she radi-
calises, much of her social media is taken up by communications setting
out to establish how Shia Muslims are ‘disgusting’, an affective process that
establishes a truth: ‘you make me sick, therefore you are sickening’
(Ahmed 2007). This is the anthropological structure of racism and hate
crime, evident in the search for purity, a search that radicalises anxiety
about disorder, experienced as dirt and the risk of contamination (Dou-
glas, 1966). This fear of contamination is visceral, in that it does not work
fundamentally at the level of ideas or cognitive propositions. While still a
student, Mahmood tweets constantly about the impurity of Shia Muslims,
focusing on ruptures of borders and barriers that ensure ontological and
biological integrity. Her tweets are populated with claims that Shia Mus-
lims have sex with animals, or that the Shia religious leader Ayatollah
Khomeini approved sex with children. Her tweets, combining humour
with graphic and disturbing images, suggest a kind of horror mixed with
fascination, one where attraction and repulsion mix. It is the horror and
disgust she constructs with others through the circulation of images,
memes and jokes that allows Mahmood to embrace an imaginary of vio-
lence which she experiences in terms of purification or cleansing. So, while
still at university in Scotland, she is retweeting calls for genocide (McDon-
ald 2018).
Communitarian radicalisation also emerges among those who seek to
disengage from criminal pathways that are experienced as fundamentally
self-destructive. In a world of disorder and chaos, radicalisation involves a
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process of socialisation into a protective group which offers certainty and
order. This mirrors the process where people join gangs (McDonald 1999)
and is particularly evident in the experiential pathway of radicalisation in
prison (Khosrokhavar 2013). In such cases, such as ‘Jamal’ who radicalised
in prison and joined al-Mouhajiroun (McDonald 2018), the threat of vio-
lence is not only external, but internal – his own violence is dangerous and
unpredictable. For him, radicalisation involves the passage into a group
that offers structure and certainty, not only from the danger presented by
others, but by his own potential for uncontrollable violence. In his case,
just as joining a gang, radicalisation is fundamentally a passage from disor-
der to order. From this perspective, violence is a strategy to impose order in
a world of disorder.
A different expression of communitarian radicalisation is evident
among adolescent girls who radicalise as a group, as we see with a group of
schoolgirls who travelled to Syria from London in February 2015. These
girls live their lives on social media, where we encounter themes of vulner-
ability, beauty, truth and sisterhood. They live in a world of adolescent fu-
sion, a way they are managing the passage from childhood to adulthood.
This way of managing this transition is different from that of gang
membership. The gang is a means to impose order on disorder, a response
to exclusion often experienced in school or neighbourhood. While many
gangs become involved in criminality, involvement in criminality is often
a means to be valued or included in a protective social group – evident in
the role of violence in initiation rituals, a rite of passage that demonstrates
loyalty to the group and its leaders (McDonald 1999).
The experience of these girls is equally one of transition from childhood
to adulthood. However, there are few signs that they are excluded from
school or neighbourhood, factors typically associated with the transition
into a counter-world of the gang. Instead, the profile of these girls is one of
‘good student’. Just as Mahmood, they are aware of distant suffering, and
they too live their lives through social media. But they are younger than
Mahmood, and their world is one where they share their love for each oth-
er as ‘sisters’. However, they are leaving childhood, and with this comes
the potential for relationships with boys, bringing with it jealousy that
could fracture the love of the group for each other. However it is possible
for the group to share one love, in this case the love of a powerful divine
Other, a kind of fusional adolescent religious experience (Guitton 2015).
This love will not shatter the sisterhood, on the contrary, it reinforces it.
This helps us understand how these girls could travel to Syria, knowing
that they will marry within weeks of arriving, and that the person they will
marry is someone they don’t know. It is precisely because they do not know
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their future husband that they can imagine marrying him: he is not an in-
dividual, he is a cypher, an expression of the God who is made real
through the power of the Calif. This is not a love relationship that individ-
uates. It is a love relationship that is not only consistent with the sister-
hood, it takes the sisterhood to the next level. In this adventure of hijra
they are embarking upon, the sisters can share everything, even their hus-
band. In the words of another young woman who travelled to Syria, ‘Being
co wives with ur bestfriend is beautiful’ (@GreenBirds22, Twitter 9 July 2014).
Not all girls follow this radicalisation pathway, but it is associated with
a fusion experience typical of the strategies young people use to navigate
from the safety of the family to the uncertainty of a wider social world. In
this case, radicalisation is framed in terms of sisters sharing everything,
even a husband. Hence the fundamental importance of travelling as a
group, and an imaginary that cannot extend beyond this. One of the girls
was interviewed by a British newspaper in 2019 after the fall of the Islamic
State. Reflecting on the war in Syria and the possibility of death, she states
‘I always thought if we did get killed, we would get killed together’ (Loyd,
2019). The sisters would also share death.
You
A very different pathway emerges among gamers, hackers and among
groups involved in criminality. In these cases, radicalisation is fundamen-
tally experienced in terms of increased power, while violence is an act
which reveals a truth about the victim.
Before he travelled to Syria, Junaid Hussain, the principal creator of the
IS Cyber Caliphate, was convicted for hacking into the email of a staff offi-
cer of the then UK Prime Minister, as well as hacking a UK terrorist help
line. Hussain had originally been involved in the ‘Mujahideen Hacking
Unit’, a group involved in attacking Hindu nationalist sites in India. From
there he extended to attacking poorly defended websites in order to post
conspiracy theory messages, largely asserting that the United States was re-
sponsible for the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and
Pentagon .2 As leader of the hacker group TeaMp0isoN, Hussain defaced
hundreds of websites, leaving messages celebrating his power, mastery and
destiny, using the name ‘TriCk’ (McDonald 2018). In these actions, the
fundamental affect involved is shared humour – Hussain celebrates his
2 See, for example (http://www.zone-h.com/mirror/id/126846110).
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skill and epic destiny as a hacker, while also revealing the weakness of his
victim. When Hussain explained his path to hacking, well before his deci-
sion to travel to Syria and create the Cyber Califate, he describes discover-
ing a world of hidden power, his discovery that the world is governed by
secret forces, in particular the Illuminati, the Freemasons, and the Com-
mittee of 300 (McDonald 2018). His radicalisation alerts us to the perva-
sive presence of conspiracy theory among jihadists, embedded in an experi-
ential structure of the hidden and the revealed. The person who has discov-
ered such conspiracies is energised and transformed: they believe they have
the courage to look at the world directly, they are not afraid to take the red
pill (to evoke the language of contemporary neo-Nazis who describe their
discovery of hidden Jewish plots to control the world at being ‘red pilled’)
(Evans 2018). In a world shaped by conspiracies, the powerful are always
hidden, and hence while Hussain’s image was all over social media, he was
always masked – the mask not being a means to hide his identity, but a
technology of transformation. Masking allows Hussain to become some-
one else, defined by his power. Living in a world of conspiracy is to live in
an affective state where hidden meaning is just out sight around the cor-
ner, of breathless excitement and of the certainty of one’s own superiority
to those who either are not smart enough to see the conspiracy, or lack the
courage to look at the world as it is.
In the radicalisation of Junaid Hussain we encounter an experiential
structure of power and pleasure that is also fundamental to criminal path-
ways that combine personal redemption with the sacralisation of war
against society (Roy 2017). From this perspective, violence does not simply
seek to kill, it seeks to humiliate, in order to reveal a truth about the vic-
tim. Hence the importance of communicating such violence, and involving
others in this, even at distance. In such cases, the action mirrors that of the
bully – their violence is public, and they seek to turn their audience into
protagonists through humiliating the victim in a way that will get their au-
dience to laugh. This underlines the fundamental dimension of humour in
the communication associated with such violence – laughing together be-
ing a fundamental social activity. And here too we encounter the funda-
mental importance of humour in far-right extremism, built around laugh-
ter at the suffering and humiliation of the other, and the celebration of the
power of the observer. The extensive role of humour and parody in violent
extreme right networks, underlines the celebration of the power not to be
affected by the suffering of the other (Greene 2019). Here we encounter a
range of experiences all associated with a paradigm of ‘gamification’ (Mc-
Donald 2018), where radicalisation is lived through relationships of win-
ning and losing, while violence is experienced as fundamentally revealing
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a truth about its victim – hence the importance of videoing and uploading
images of the humiliation of the victim, laughing and taking pleasure in
the suffering of the other.
In such cases, violence equally reveals a truth about the perpetrator –
hence the importance of filming the self, narcissism and a culture of fame.
This was particularly evident in the case of Abdulhamid Aboud, the leader
of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, who during his time in Syria wore
a GoPro camera attached to his hat, and would upload images to his Twit-
ter account each day to celebrate his exploits (McDonald 2018).
‘I’
A quite different experience of radicalisation centres on experiences of self-
hood. In this pathway, what counts is the ‘I’. Here we encounter experi-
ences all based around the idea of rupture with one’s past, where violence
is an imaginary that both destroys one’s past and reveals a truth about one-
self.
Such violence, as in the other examples we are discussing, is not limited
to experience of radicalisation. The paradigm case is the school shooter,
who seeks to fracture reality through the scale of violence. Here an imagi-
nary of scale is fundamental – the violence is to be ‘epic’, so great that it
will fracture reality itself, and in the process reveal the greatness of the pro-
tagonist. This violence is intoxicating, one where the protagonist can de-
clare ‘I am a god’, a truth that will be revealed through the enormity of the
killings they will undertake. This imaginary of greatness is not only associ-
ated with school shooters. It is evident in the narcissism of conspiracy the-
ory (where once again only the most intelligent and most courageous can
see truth).
The ‘I’ also emerges as central to a range of experiences shaped by
themes of vastness and enormity. These were at the centre of the History of
Humanity videos produced by Omar Diaby that proved so important in
among the first wave of French people to travel to Syria, being extensively
downloaded and discussed on jihadist websites (Thomson 2018). The con-
stant theme in these breathless discussions is the vastness of the conspiracy
that is behind world government, a conspiracy shaped by dark supernatu-
ral powers (jinn and the promise of the antichrist, the dajall). While based
on extraordinary secrets, this world, as in all conspiracy theories, is made
up of the day-to-day events that are fundamentally familiar. Diaby’s videos,
framed with threatening soundtracks and ominous colour palettes com-
bined with blurred and distorted extracts from the television news, com-
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municate a world that is familiar, but at the same time fundamentally
strange. To draw on Freud, this is the ‘uncanny’ – the familiar turned
weird and threatening (Freud 1919/2003). All these experiences give rise to
an affective state of fear and anxiety, a world in disorder and chaos, associ-
ated with an aesthetic experience more than a desire to construct a com-
munity of order. This same theme of vastness and insignificance, close to
the Romantic experience of the sublime, recurs throughout jihadi culture.
We encounter another experience of ‘I’ in experiences of radicalisation.
This is where death is not a means to cleanse the world through killing the
other, as with Mahmood, but is a means to purify the self (Khosrokhavar
2014). In such cases, death not only obliterates the self, but the life one has
led. We see this in Brahim Abdesalam’s suicide bombing at the Comptoir
Voltaire in Paris in the November 2015 attack, where he sets out to kill
himself and the patrons in a bar. He does not run in shouting and threat-
ening, seeking to instil fear in terror in those he will kill. As he quietly
walks into the bar, no one even looks at him. He pauses, places his hands
over his face, takes several breaths, and then detonates his suicide belt3.
Only a month earlier he had been the manager of a bar in Brussels that
had been closed by police on the ground that it was being used as a base to
distribute drugs (McDonald 2018). This violence does not attempt to hu-
miliate or terrify its victims. Abdesalam is not seeking to reveal their un-
worthiness through humiliating them. His violence is focused on the self.
Far-Right Radicalisation
The analytical categories that emerge in the analysis of jihadist radicalisa-
tion offer insight into the far-right radicalisation emerging in Europe,
North America and the industrialised nations of the Pacific. Fundamental-
ly different from the neo-Nazi street fighters of the 1980s, this radicalisa-
tion is framed by affects and imaginaries that have their origins in digitally
mediated worlds.
The idea of livestreaming mass killing was first associated with Euro-
pean jihadists in Syria. But it also emerged at the same time on the image
board 4Chan, where in 2014 a man uploaded images of his girlfriend who
3 The attack was filmed by the café security camera. Extracts from this film are wide-
ly available online, for example at (https://video-streaming.orange.fr/tv/inedit-m6-
diffuse-l-explosion-de-brahim-abdeslam-au-comptoir-voltaire-CNT000001a3R-
JM.html).
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he had just strangled, commenting that this was much more difficult than
in the movies (Nagle 2017: 27). In the case of 4Chan, such examples of
streaming murder were first associated with groups describing themselves
as ‘robots’, and later ‘incels’ (involuntarily celibates). Opposed to both
feminism and non-whites, this imaginary of violence comes to be em-
braced by contemporary expressions of neo-Nazism, as a cohort left 4Chan
to move to 8Chan. This is fundamental to understand two far-right killings
that took place in 2019: the March 2019 mass killing of people praying in
two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, and the October 2019 at-
tempted mass killing of people praying at a synagogue in Halle, Germany.
Both these attacks owe a significant debt to imaginaries of violence con-
structed by school shooters, which became increasingly visible on 4chan
with the introduction of its /r/ (relationships) board, a board that came to
be populated by the group we now call Incels. In October 2015 Chris
Harper Mercer announced on 4Chan’s /r/ board that he was going to un-
dertake a mass killing at a school on the next day (Nagle 2017: 26). Ideas
about how to proceed were shared, with Harper Mercer at one point ask-
ing those in the discussion to ‘keep me in your prayers’. Throughout the
discussion he receives advice and support, one participant welcoming his
declaration as the beginning of the ‘beta uprising’ (here ‘beta’ refers to ‘be-
ta males’ who are not able to gain the affection of women). In the ‘mani-
festo’ that Harper Mercer distributed to his victims before killing them, he
declares that he dies a virgin, evokes the Columbine killers, but he also
evokes Satan as the source of his action, promising to return to life after his
death as a vampire. He has previously explored the ‘lost secrets of the Illu-
minati’. Similar references to Satanism and other expressions of the occult
recur in the imaginary of neo-Nazi groups such as System Resistance Net-
work in the United Kingdom, evoking the place of the occult in the
Nazism during the fascist era (Staudenmaier 2014).
What is striking is the extent of themes that are shared by jihadist and
far-right violence: racial disgust framed within an imaginary of purity and
impurity; a desire for death of the self within a desire to fracture the real
through the scale of violence; the vertigo of power associated with the dis-
covery of hidden conspiracies and knowledge; fascination with the sub-
lime, expressed in terms of attraction and repulsion. Humour plays a simi-
lar and fundamental communicative role in both jihadist and far-right ex-
tremism. Historically these themes have played an important role in far-
left violent extremism as well. The leaders of the American Weather Un-
derground were fascinated by the violence of Charles Manson’s murderous
cult (Varon 2004), while conspiracy theories around Jewish financial pow-
er retain a significant place in the imaginary of the far-left (Byford 2011).
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My Name is Anon
On October 9, 2019, the day of Yom Kippur, a 29-year old man attempted
to attack a Jewish synagogue in the city of Halle, Germany, live streaming
the attack from a camera he was wearing. Equipped with poorly construct-
ed home-made explosives and weapons, he was unable to gain entry to the
synagogue, and proceeded instead to kill two people he encountered – the
first a woman who was walking past him in the street and admonished
him for the disturbance he was making, the second victim was a patron in
a kebab shop. He streamed the video of the attack from a camera he was
wearing to a gaming platform. Immediately before attempting to enter the
synagogue, the alleged killer directed his camera towards himself, and
speaks to it:
‘Hi, my name is Anon. I think the Holocaust never happened.
Femimism is the cause of the decline of the West which acts as a scapegoat
for mass immigration. And the root of all these problems is the Jew.
Would you like to be friends?’ (archived video).
This brief statement captures critical dimensions of an experience of
radicalisation. The attacker is speaking in English: he is not an ultranation-
alist, he is not defending a national identity. Something else happening.
The attacker begins by declaring ‘My name is Anon’. The term ‘Anon’
refers to 4Chan and 8Chan. These are both anonymous discussion boards,
where the website attributes ‘Anon’ as the ‘name’ or ‘handle’ to every per-
son who posts to the site. Describing himself as ‘Anon’ signals that he is
part of an online world, and that he is sharing his attack with that world.
He posts livestream of the attack to an online gaming platform. He begins
by an act of Holocaust denial, thus affirming his links with neo-Nazism.
But why does he state that feminism is the source of what he sees as the
decline of the West, and the cause of mass migration? This is because he
believes that as a result of feminism, women refuse to have sex with men
like him, and the resulting population decline is the source of mass immi-
gration – leading, he believes, to the replacement of the white race. But
how is it possible that the Jewish people are at the source of this decline?
Because he believes that feminism is the product of Jewish intellectuals.
This reflects a widespread campaign on alt-right social media that ‘Femi-
nism is a Jewish war on women’, a theme widely repeated on neo-fascist
online platforms.
The attacker also posted a manifesto online, where he refers to conspira-
cy tropes of ZOG – Zionist Occupied Government – and gamer culture,
completing his manifesto with a ‘jej’, used in place of LOL. Throughout
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his manifesto his style of humour is self-deprecating, he is not presenting
himself as a god wreaking vengeance.
While the attacker does not refer to his action as ‘we’, it was received
and welcomed in those terms on 4Chan’s /pol/ board. One poster writes:
‘WE ARE MAKING PROGRESS
WE HAVE THE POWER TO KILL I.R.L.
WE ARE THE M.K. ULTRA NOW!
They will never laugh at us again, boys. We can wear our fedoras again,
with pride!
Praise KEK!’ (4Chan/pol/, 10 October 2019)4
The reference to ‘never laugh at us again’ and ‘fedoras’ evokes dimensions
of Incel culture, being laughed at by others or wearing unfashionable fedo-
ra hats. The Halle attack is celebrated on 4Chan as reversing this stigma, an
act through which ‘we’ are making progress, ‘we’ have the power to kill in
real life, indeed ‘we’ are so powerful that we can be compared with what
members of 4Chan believe to be the secret FBI mind control programme,
M.K. Ultra. This poster also refers to ‘KEK’. Originally a gamer expression
for LOL emerging in World of Warcraft, in December 2017 KEK was trans-
formed on 4Chan’s /h/ or ‘history’ board into a mythical god, represented
by Pepe the Frog, a figure that had become claimed by alt-right groups as
their own. Not long after the creation of the god KEK, other participants
in 4Chan created a country that the god KEK rules, calling it Kekistan, and
imagining it inhabited by Kekistanis. Then on 4Chan a movement for the
liberation of this fictional country developed. Over the following 12
months Kekistan became a central motif of a cluster of videos extending
and developing principally on YouTube, rapidly expanding in scope, in
part responding to the algorithm that builds links between themes across
the platform. This has provided the basis for the expansion of Kekistan as
an imaginary, a parody of liberation struggles, associated with the call to
‘kill all normies’ (Nagel 2017). The production and circulation of YouTube
videos was central to this process, driven by what Emeline de Keulenaar
describes as ‘the ironic, trolling, countercultural online right’ (2019: 2).
Here we encounter a political project constructed in the language of irony
and parody. While KEK emerged in a process of playing with mashup cul-
ture, and was not originally associated with Nazism, the link has now been
forged, in particular through the creation of the flag of Kekistan, modelled
4 This conversation is archived at (https://archive.4plebs.org/pol/thread/229357532/
#q229360881).
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on the warflag of Nazi Germany. This flag appeared at the Unite the Right
demonstration in the United States, and also at pro-Bolsonaro rallies in
Brazil.
An important current in the alt-right emerges from the world of
gamers, with significant debts to the anti-feminist mobilisation referred to
as ‘gamergate’ (Bezio 2018). Originating as a campaign against a victim of
revenge porn, gamergate mobilised an opposition to political correctness,
explicitly framing this as anti-feminist. This converged with Incel culture
on shared digital platforms, where Incel appeals to violence against wom-
en often draw upon an imaginary of opposition to black men, presented as
desired by women. It is the opposition to both women and non-whites
that has been the basis for the convergence between Incels and white
supremacism evident in the attempted massacre in Halle in October 2019.
Conspiracy theories play a role throughout these different pathways.
There is a convergence with the experience of gaming, where the world is
experienced in terms of multiple levels and hidden meanings. It was this
convergence that allowed Junaid Hussain to move so easily from the world
of gaming and involvement in Anonymous to the world of the jihad, evi-
dent in the way the Cyber Caliphate he created drew on the imaginary of
Anonymous and its practice of ‘doxing’, a practice that involves posting
private information to online sites (see McDonald 2015). Hussain’s Islamic
State Cyber Caliphate hacked into low security department store websites
in the United States to identify the private addresses and phone numbers
of US service personnel. It then posted this information online, calling on
ISIS supporters in the US to go to these addresses and kill the occupants.
These online posts were accompanied by the celebratory claim ‘we know ev-
erything about you’. In Hussain’s world, the powerful are invisible, while
the powerless are exposed. The passage from a world devoted to secret
meanings is also evident in the experience of Sally Jones who travelled
with Hussain to Syria, who before embracing jihadism was a practitioner
of alternative art and witchcraft (McDonald 2018), where the access to se-
cret knowledge is a path to pleasure and power.
Conclusion: Experiences of Radicalisation
The radicalisation pathways we have explored in this chapter are not the
result of manipulation or recruitment, but nor are they a reflection of ar-
chaic religious beliefs or the action of religious zealots. A great deal is
shared between jihadist radicalisation and the alt-right that has become in-
creasingly visible in Europe and North-America over the past decade. Just
Kevin McDonald
46 https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748905738-31, am 29.09.2020, 12:10:38
Open Access -  - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
as the alt-right in Europe and North America evokes fears of collective dis-
appearance in its narrative of ‘great replacement’ focusing on migration, so
too imaginaries of death appear increasingly evident in communal ten-
sions in Asia, most recently in Sri Lanka with rumours of sterilisation
creams being applied to women’s underwear by Muslim shopkeepers,
claimed to be a means for Muslims to replace the Sinhalese population
(Amarasingam 2019). The occult plays an important role in contemporary
jihadism, mirroring the place of Satanism in Nazi subcultures in both
North American and Europe. Similar themes of secret knowledge, vast
conspiracies, immense danger and the promise of great power, all play an
important role in the affective world sustaining the growth of jihadism in
Asia, clearly evident in Indonesia (Fealy 2019).
Shifting our focus to a much closer engagement with actual experiences
of radicalisation allows us to see clearly a new paradigm of violence emerg-
ing, one that is very different from the ‘clandestine political violence’ of
the 1970s. What is very clear is the extent to which jihadist and alt-right
extremism demonstrate similar practices and cultures: the importance of
masking, an experiential structure built around the opposition between
the hidden and the revealed; the experience of empowerment associated
with the discovery of hidden knowledge. A closer engagement with experi-
ences of radicalisation also highlights very different practices and imagi-
naries of violence. Here we encounter violence as cleansing, mirroring the
same experiential structure as racism and hate crime; violence as revealing a
truth about the protagonist and/or the victim; and lastly, violence as fractur-
ing reality (search for scale of killing, obliteration of self and other). From
this perspective, radicalisation is not an experience of manipulation or re-
cruitment, nor is it an expression of religious rejection of the world.
Rather it is a form of practice or agency best understood as world-building.
As such, radicalisation needs to be understood as an inherently political
endeavour5, a form of political action best understood as a project of ‘anti-
democracy’, or what Rosanvallon (2008) describes as politics in an age of
distrust. The closer we get to actual experiences of radicalisation the more
clearly we see the extent to which this involves embodied, communicative
subjectivity, where actors produce and are sustained by an ‘affective fabric’
that is increasingly evident in digital sociality: practices of humour, ex-
ploit, fear, parody and irony, racism, celebrity, fascination with the occult,
a contemporary dread of insignificance. It only through engaging with and
5 I would like to thank our editor, Dr. La Toya Waha, for underlining this dimen-
sion of radicalisation in her response to an earlier draft of this chapter.
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understanding such practices that we can hope to understand, and build
responses to, the contemporary allure of radicalisation.
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